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For a number of years many of us have been saying that the changes underway in 
private sector workplace practices call for a major updating and modernizing of 
national labor and employment policies. The final report and recommendations 
issued by the Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations (the 
Dunlop Commission) have now opened the debate over how to do so. As a member 
of the Commission I support fully its findings and recommendations. But, these 
recommendations are only a first step in what is likely to be a long process of 
debate. The Commission's recommendations are not as far-reaching as some would 
prefer. They go only part way toward the type of comprehensive overhaul of the 
New Deal labor policy framework some of us, including myself, have called for in 
our individual work (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). 
The recommendations also entail some risks. The biggest risk is that business 
groups, labor unions, the Congress, or the Administration will endorse and attempt 
to enact only those recommendations that are consistent with their ideological 
leanings, despite the Commission's strongly stated view that its recommendations 
are highly interdependent and should not be acted on in isolation. If this happens, 
the decades long stalemate over labor policy will continue, perhaps until the 
frustration of American workers and voters boil over and create the type of crisis 
that finally forces their leaders out of their fixed and partisan positions. 
There is an alternative. It is for everyone to see the report and recommendations for 
what they are, namely sensible and rather simple starting points for building, over 
time, a fundamentally new labor and employment policy needed to make America 
competitive at high standards of living. Employers committed to using employee 
participation to improve productivity and quality can gain the flexibility to do so 
free of the legal uncertainty that has been hovering over some of these practices. 
Moreover, employers can further use employee participation and alternative dispute 
resolution procedures to reduce litigation costs and the burdens of government 
regulations. Employees can gain what labor law promises but has not delivered for 
many years--an effective right to choose whether or not to be represented by a union 
at the workplace and greater choice over the forms of participation and/or 
representation that best suit their needs. Employees also can gain access to fair, low 
cost systems for resolving workplace problems and disputes over the rights 
guaranteed them in employment laws. Unions can expand the broad based labor-
management partnerships they have underway in many industries and have a fair 
chance to organize workers who want collective bargaining,. Further, unions can 
develop new forms of representation for workers who need more individualistic 
workplace and labor market services. 
These potential mutual gains will only be achieved, however, if everyone focuses on 
these opportunities presented in the full report, rather than on specific parts that 
challenge their prior positions. Some employers will not like, but need to face, the 
finding that labor law is not working to protect individual employee rights to join a 
union. Some union leaders will not like, but must face, the fact that many non-union 
employees want to participate in cooperative efforts with employers without the 
protections a union offers. Women's groups and civil rights advocates will need to 
recognize the only way to get justice on the job today for all workers without long 
delays and insurmountable legal costs is to develop fair private dispute resolution 
procedures. 
Taking this perspective requires leadership with a vision of the workplace of the 
future. The report offers such as vision, based on what workers, managers, and 
union leaders told us fit their views of a high performance workplace today. We 
therefore suggest a set of ten goals for the Workplace of the 21st Century (see 
Figure 1) and propose monitoring the nation's progress toward achieving these 
goals. Achieving them will require hard work from a coalition of diverse voices in 
society. The question is whether current leaders in business, labor, the Congress, 
and the Administration are up to this task. 
In this paper I'd like to address the question of "where do we go from here?" That is, 
given the difficult political climate for labor policy making, how can the 
Commission's recommendations be used to their maximum advantage to improve 
workplace relations and performance? I begin by summarizing the Commission's 
recommendations and commenting on the opportunities and risks they pose to the 
parties. Then I outline steps that government agencies, public-private groups, and 
the parties at the workplace can take to promote further innovations in workplace 
relations. I conclude by sketching several possible scenarios for the future. 
The Dunlop Commission's Finding and Recommendations
The Commission was asked to address the following three issues: 
z What (if any) new methods or institutions should be encouraged, or required, 
to enhance workplace productivity through labor-management cooperation 
and employee participation? 
z What (if any) changes should be made in the present legal framework and 
practices of collective bargaining to enhance cooperative behavior, improve 
productivity, and reduce conflict and delay? 
z What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent to which workplace 
problems are directly resolved by the parties themselves, rather than through 
recourse to state and federal courts and government regulatory bodies? 
In the sections that follow I will use the three topics in our Mission statement to 
summarize our findings and recommendations. 
Employee Participation
The Commission concluded that employee participation and labor-management 
cooperation are in the interests of workers, employers, and the national economy 
and therefore ought to be supported by national policy. This implied a need to 
address the constraints imposed on employee participation by Section 8(a)(2) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). At the same time, the Commission was 
equally determined to not encourage or allow the return of company dominated 
unions that this section of the law was designed to eliminate. Various modifications 
of the doctrines governing Section 8(a)(2) were proposed to the Commission. They 
ranged from maintaining the status quo, to modest expansions in the issues that 
employee participation groups could address legally, to allowing expansion of 
employee participation subject to meeting certain minimum standards (e.g. allowing 
employees to vote on or select their representatives on teams or committees). The 
Commission concluded that a modest departure from current doctrines was the best 
approach. Instead of trying to draw a new line over permissible and non-permissible 
subjects or individuals to be involved, we recommended clarifying the law and its 
interpretation by the NLRB so that employee participation would not be judged 
illegal solely because participants discussed terms and conditions of employment as 
an incidental part of the process. The ban on company dominated unions would 
continue. We also endorse use of employee participation on certain workplace 
topics regulated by public law such as workplace safety and health, and encourage 
use of private dispute resolution procedures for resolving alleged violations of 
worker rights, provided that these processes meet certain guidelines or quality 
standards. Guidelines and standards are appropriate in these areas because they 
involve rights and duties of employees and employers contained in public law. 
Therefore, we are delegating responsibility for enforcing these rights to the parties 
at the workplace. In this way employers, employees, and unions have both the 
opportunity and the responsibility to manage these issues without having to rely 
solely on enforcement and litigation through government agencies or the courts. The 
Commission made three other recommendations in this area of the law. First, we 
recommended strengthening and extending protections against discrimination for 
participating in these programs, speaking about them at the workplace, or requesting 
assistance from outside organizations. Second, changes in the definition of 
supervisor were suggested to avoid having workers who make supervisory decisions 
as a result of participation in new work systems lose their right to collective 
bargaining as the Supreme Court had ruled in cases involving university professors 
(Yeshiva) and registered nurses (Health Care Corporation). Third, we recommended 
allowing pre-hire agreements where a company with an existing bargaining 
agreement opens a new facility. The purpose of this recommendation was to allow 
companies and unions to do what General Motors and the United Auto Workers did 
in creating the Saturn Corporation, i.e., to negotiate a state-of-the-art labor 
agreement before a plant opens or the workforce is in place, subject to a subsequent 
vote or card check certification by the workforce after the facility is in operation. 
These recommendations pose both risks and opportunities. The obvious risk is that 
some employers will abuse the discretion provided by setting up participation 
programs to defeat or discourage efforts of employees to join independent unions. 
Yet survey data have consistently documented that a majority of workers want to 
have greater influence and voice on their job and at the same time want sufficient 
independence to choose their representatives (Freeman and Rogers, 1994). This set 
of recommendations opens the door for considerable institutional innovation with 
respect to employee participation. My personal view is that these recommendations 
will only achieve their intended results if they give rise to a wider array of 
participation processes. How might this be done? 
One way would be for unions and professional associations to offer the services and 
expertise needed to promote the various forms of employee participation. That is, I 
believe that the best way for unions to represent workers effectively in the future is 
to become "full service agents" by providing collective bargaining representation, 
individual representation to workers in enforcing their legal rights, promoting self-
governance at the workplace, and consultation and technical services to workers on 
matters such as safety and health, new work systems, education, training, labor 
market information, and other issues that are subject to employee- management 
consultation. The Commission's recommendations clearly allow for development of 
these types of roles and organizations by expressly noting that workers should have 
the right to draw on outside assistance, or join and be represented by organizations 
of their own choosing. 
A full service union or professional association would have three ways of recruiting 
members. First, it could continue to organize workers for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. Second, individual memberships with a variety of representational and 
technical services such as those suggested above can be offered to those who either 
do not want exclusive representation and collective bargaining or who cannot 
convince the majority of their peers to vote for collective bargaining. This is akin to 
the professional association model of representation. Finally, unions can also offer 
workers a full range of services including support for participation in workplace 
affairs, collective bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions, and 
representation at the strategic level of enterprise decision-making. That is, they can 
market their services as a complete representational package, something that no 
non-union firm can match through management designed employee participation or 
dispute resolution programs. 
These recommendations also provide employers with an opportunity to expand 
employee participation without fear of breaking the law simply because the issues 
discussed cross over into conditions of work. Employers and employees can go 
further and extend participation to other areas of employment relations that involve 
public rights such as workplace safety and health or dispute resolution systems if 
these processes meet the general guidelines established by the agencies responsible 
for enforcing these statutory rights. I believe that this is one of the most important 
opportunities for institutional innovation encouraged by the Commission's 
recommendations. 
Some of us on the Commission would have preferred to go a step farther and, 
consistent with our prior writings, recommend creating an American version of 
European works councils on either a voluntary or mandated basis (Kochan and 
McKersie, 1989; Weiler, 1990; Rogers and Freeman, 1993; Kochan and Osterman, 
1994). The problem was that, aside from some academics (Adams, 1985), there was 
no constituency in favor of this! If there is to be anything like works councils in the 
U.S., it is clear that they will need to emerge incrementally and experimentally in 
the same fashion as employee involvement programs and other workplace 
innovations evolved over the past two decades or so. While the Commission's 
recommendations do not explicitly propose formation of councils that reflect the full 
makeup of an establishment's workforce, they clearly allow for experimentation with 
such bodies on selected issues such as safety and health and other workplace 
regulations. 
Worker Representation and Collective Bargaining
The Commission was able to draw on considerable empirical evidence generated by 
independent researchers and government data in analyzing the current state of the 
law and practice concerning the exercise of workers' rights to join a union and 
engage in collective bargaining. The evidence presented in these studies led to the 
following key conclusions that then framed our recommendations: 
1. Representation elections as currently conducted are highly conflictual for 
workers, unions, and firms. This means that many new collective bargaining 
relationships start off in an environment that is highly adversarial. 
2. The probability has increased over time that a worker will be discharged or 
unfairly discriminated against for exercising legal rights under the NLRA. 
3. Roughly a third of the workplaces that vote to be represented by a union do not 
obtain a collective bargaining agreement. 
4. About one third of unorganized workers would vote to be represented by a union 
if an election were held at their workplaces. 
Given this record, the only conclusion one could reach is that the law is not 
delivering on its promise--to provide workers' the right to choose whether or not to 
be represented by a union for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
A large number of recommendations were presented to the Commission on how to 
remedy problems with the law. These ranged from those that would stay within the 
basic framework of exclusive representation and collective bargaining to those that 
would allow for different forms of representation including works councils, minority 
and/or members' only unionism, worker representation on corporate boards of 
directors, etc. Specific recommendations proposed increased penalties for violations 
of law, suggestions for reducing delays, stronger protections against employee 
discharge, speedier procedures for reinstating employees whose rights are violated, 
and arbitration of first contracts. 
The Commission took a relatively conservative approach to changes in this area of 
labor law by recommending strategies to reduce conflict, encourage prompt 
elections, require the NLRB to obtain injunctions to reinstate workers who are fired 
illegally, and create a dispute settlement process including, as a last resort, binding 
arbitration of first contract disputes. 
One of the most significant recommendations in this area is the dispute settlement 
procedure for first contracts that includes, as an option, binding arbitration. The 
Commission calls for creation of a tripartite First Contract Advisory Board by the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) that would decide on whether 
an impasse in first contract negotiations should be referred to the parties for direct 
action (strike or lockout) or to arbitration for a binding decision. The goal of this 
settlement procedure is to encourage the parties to reach agreements and avoid a 
spillover of the conflict and efforts to defeat the union into the first contract 
negotiation process. Making this process work will require that the tripartite 
advisory board functions as a neutral group of labor relations professionals and not 
as narrow partisan advocates. 
Workplace Regulation, Litigation, and Dispute Resolution
The third item on the Commission's agenda opens up a wide range of possibilities 
for workers, unions, and employers to develop workplace systems for resolving 
disputes and adapting regulations to fit the varying circumstances of different 
workplaces. As the Fact Finding report noted, the Commission generally believes 
that the tools of our field--mediation, arbitration, employee participation, and other 
alternative dispute resolution procedures--could be more fully used to resolve issues 
that now end up in the courts or backlogged in enforcement agencies. 
These recommendations also offer a way to separate employment relationships with 
effective workplace institutions that can take on some of the regulatory functions 
from those without such institutions and therefore need to remain subject to the 
standard approach to regulation and enforcement. 
The Commission recommended that OSHA establish guidelines for effective 
workplace safety and health programs that include employee participation. 
Workplaces with these types of programs in place and that demonstrate adequate 
levels of safety performance would not be subject to OSHA's normal inspection and 
penalty procedures. In contrast, the workplaces without such self- governance 
programs and/or that have not demonstrated adequate performance would continue 
to be subject to standard enforcement procedures. Other regulatory agencies are 
encouraged to develop similar approaches tailored to their particular regulatory 
issue. 
We also recommend experimentation with private voluntary procedures including 
arbitration for resolving disputes involving workers' statutory rights. A set of 
"quality standards" covering issues such as the right to outside representation, the 
qualifications of neutrals, cost sharing arrangements, arbitrator selection, arbitration 
procedures, the standards for agency and judicial review, etc. are also suggested for 
these systems. 
A number of difficulties need to be addressed in implementing these 
recommendations. One is overcoming the high level of skepticism and criticism that 
some arbitration arrangements have come under recently. This is one reason for 
specifying clear and stringent quality standards for arbitration. A second and more 
difficult problem is how to overcome the skepticism of womens' and civil rights' 
organizations that have worked over the years to strengthen individual rights and 
gain access to federal courts to enforce these rights. Three major concerns were 
raised by these groups: (1) Private arbitration might reduce the deterrent effect of 
the threat of lawsuits and jury awards, (2) private dispute resolution systems will 
freeze or reinforce the power imbalance that currently exists between individual 
workers and employers, and (3) employers should not be allowed to implement 
these systems unilaterally and make them a term and condition of employment. 
The Commission's recommendations attempt to address these concerns while 
strongly endorsing and encouraging experimentation with high quality dispute 
resolution systems. We stress the principle that employees should have a voice in 
the design and oversight of workplace dispute resolution procedures. Liberalizing 
employee participation to insure the legality of employee participation in the design 
and operation of voluntary dispute resolution systems should provide such an 
opportunity. Encouraging unions and professional associations to expand the 
services they provide to individual workers in this area should as well. 
We explicitly recommend against allowing employers to impose binding arbitration 
unilaterally as a condition of employment. Instead we propose beginning on a 
voluntary basis. The EEOC and enforcement agencies in the Department of Labor 
explore ways to encourage use of procedures that meet the recommended quality 
standards and that provide for employee participation. 
Another area of employment regulation that the Commission recognized as needing 
attention concerns the definitions of employer and employee in contingent work 
settings. Ambiguity over who is the employer to be held responsible for meeting the 
requirements of employment and labor laws for contingent workers sometimes 
results in a breakdown in coverage for some, often low wage employees. Moreover, 
the economic incentives to misclassify workers as independent contractors to avoid 
responsibilities under labor, employment, and tax laws results in significant revenue 
losses as well as a gap in the legal and financial protections these laws are designed 
to provide. 
The Commission lacked adequate data for addressing the full range of issues 
associated with the growth of contingent work. Therefore we made only modest 
recommendations in this area and urged these issues be studied more thoroughly as 
more data become available. Our recommendations are to move to a standard 
definition of the terms employer and employee for the purposes of labor and 
employment law. This is also an area where the NLRB needs to reexamine its 
doctrines and we recommended it do so as well. 
Blueprint for Action
Congress
Given these recommendations, how can we best move forward to sustain and diffuse 
the positive innovations at the workplace and tackle the major obstacles limiting 
their potential? The obvious first step is to enact the changes in law and to authorize 
the administrative experimentation suggested in the recommendations. A 
comprehensive bill would include the following elements: 
1. Changes in the NLRA needed to implement the recommendations on employee 
participation, representation election procedures, and first contract dispute 
resolution. 
2. Clear directives to OSHA, other Department of Labor regulatory agencies, and 
the EEOC to experiment with alternative dispute resolution and self governance 
programs that conform to the quality standards suggested in the report. This 
directive should also encourage federal agencies to initiate coordinated experiments 
with state agencies that regulate the same issues. 
3. Directives to all regulatory agencies to move to a common definition of employer 
and employee for the purposes of enforcing labor and employment laws using an 
economic realities test as the basis for these definitions. 
4. Authorization and funding of the National and local forums and the supporting 
research and analysis group called for in the recommendations. 
Although not included in the Commission's recommendations, some employers and 
some members of Congress (particularly Congressman Richard Gephart) have 
expressed an interest in establishing a Workplace Excellence Award modeled after 
the Baldrige Award for quality. Such an award has proven helpful in focusing the 
private sector's attention. If the Congress decides to create a Workplace Excellence 
Award, I would urge that the goals for the Workplace of the 21st Century presented 
in the Commission's report serve as the award criteria. Such an award would both 
encourage workplaces to monitor their performance on the full range of goals listed 
in the report and would continue to call attention to the interdependent nature of 
these workplace issues. 
While each of these legislative changes is needed in its own right, piecemeal efforts 
to patch up the current law will do more harm than good. There are both technical 
and fairness reasons for this judgement. 
The technical reasons are pointed out in the report. Increasing flexibility for 
employee participation requires that workers be given the opportunity to decide on 
their own whether or not to join a union. The current law fails on this account. The 
changes in labor law designed to reduce conflicts and delay in organizing efforts and 
to improve the effectiveness of the negotiation of initial agreements are needed to 
ensure workers' rights are realized in practice. Moreover, clarification of the law 
governing employee participation is necessary to open the door to self-governance 
and experimentation with private voluntary dispute resolution procedures in which 
employees have an active voice and role in shaping and running. Likewise, true self- 
governance requires that workers have a choice over the forms of participation 
and/or representation that best suit their circumstances. 
So one can easily see the technical interrelationships among these recommended 
changes in the law. But there is a more important and subtle reason that reflects the 
present climate of labor-management relations in the country. Any effort to pick and 
choose only those changes in the law that suit one party's narrow self determined 
interest will intensify the polarization that the full set of recommendations is 
designed to reduce. Trust at the workplace cannot be built in a national environment 
of political stalemate and polarization between leaders of business and labor. 
The Administration
The Clinton Administration will need to take equally strong steps to implement 
these recommendations. Every agency regulating some aspect of the workplace 
should be required to develop a plan for acting on the recommendations to 
encourage fair and efficient private resolution of disputes and self-regulation and 
governance procedures. Together with Congress, the Adminstration should provide 
the investment funds needed to initiate and test self- regulation and dispute 
resolution procedures appropriate for each agency and area of law. But to provide 
further incentives, the Administration and the Congress should make it clear to 
individual agencies that their budgets will suffer significantly if they fail to develop 
and implement appropriate plans consistent with the general principles outlined in 
the Commission's report. 
The Administration can go considerably farther than the report suggests by working 
with corresponding state government agencies that share jurisdiction over workplace 
issues to insure that workers and employers face only one common set of legal 
requirements and that those that choose to experiment or adapt self regulatory and 
dispute resolution systems are not constrained or sidetracked by state regulations. At 
a minimum, the Department of Labor might designate one or more of its regions as 
laboratories for federal-state partnerships in experimenting with this approach. 
Indeed, the history of workers' compensation, safety and health, unemployment 
insurance, and child labor all suggest that the models for future national policy are 
likely to come from innovations at the state level. All of these now widely accepted 
federal laws were built on models provided by state-level experiences. Perhaps it is 
time for individual states to propose this type of experimental approach to the 
federal government. 
The Labor Movement
The labor movement has an important choice to make. It can oppose the 
Commission's recommendations because of its view that the expanded flexibility 
recommended for employee participation will be used to further undermine union 
organizing efforts. Or it can voice its concern with this particular recommendation 
but accept this challenge provided the other recommendations are also implemented. 
If the labor movement uses the Commission's report to fashion a positive image and 
strategy it will have a fair chance to reverse its long term membership losses by 
marketing its full service representational capabilities. If, however, labor leaders 
oppose these changes and stay with a more limited strategy, unions risk further 
declines in both their public image and membership. 
Representatives of Business
The business community also has an opportunity to take a new approach by joining 
a broad based coalition in support of modernizing the full range of labor and 
employment laws. Or it can continue to stonewall every effort to face the facts 
regarding the most egregious violations of worker rights documented in the 
Commission's findings and to rely on its newly won political influence to block any 
changes in public policy that improve the positions of workers and their 
representatives. Labor policy need not continue as a zero sum game, but it surely 
will unless the voices of employers who are already engaged in workplace 
innovations and who respect worker rights prevail over those committed to a more 
oppositional course. 
Forums for Ongoing Dialogue and Learning
The Commission recommended creating several new institutions to promote on-
going dialogue and analysis of employment issues including a National Forum for 
the Workplace, a National Labor- Management Committee, a group to provide 
research support on workplace issues, and comparable forums at local and sectoral 
levels. These institutions could turn out to be either a waste of effort or constructive 
means of fostering continued learning and the gradual development of a more 
analytical approach to labor and employment policy making and evaluation. If the 
representatives participating in these discussions use them to continue to advocate 
their narrow rhetorical positions not only will no useful purpose be served, but again 
real harm could be done by serving as an obstacle to experimentation with truly new 
ideas and approaches to addressing workplace issues. 
Alternatively, if guided by a clear sense of purpose, these discussions might 
encourage local, state, and regional experimentation with different approaches to the 
workplace issues. Moreover, by including women and civil rights representatives in 
these forums the voices of the workforce of the future are represented and the 
traditional labor versus business lines of demarcation and political battle might be 
blurred somewhat. If used for these purposes, these forums may make significant 
contributions to labor and employment policy and practice. 
The research group that supports these discussions can help to open dialogue on a 
wider range of ideas and alternative institutional approaches than would be 
considered if left to business and labor. While the researchers need to be responsive 
to the priorities established by the Forum and the Labor-Management Committee, 
they need to retain sufficient independence to do objective work and sufficient 
discretion to support research that examines options that none of the interest groups 
involved would find acceptable today. Exploration of new ideas or alternatives that 
lie beyond the limits of acceptability is critical if we are to ever get beyond the 
incremental modifications of existing practices. 
The Workforce Ultimately, the American workforce will need to demand that their 
elected representatives and leaders at the workplace take a mutual gains approach to 
these issues. Workers should insist on exercising their rights to participation, 
independent representation, and access to fair procedures for resolving workplace 
disputes. They should likewise insist on sharing equitably in the gains produced by 
their efforts to improve the economic performance of their workplaces and 
enterprises. The Worker Representation and Participation Survey done for the 
Commission (Freeman and Rogers, 1994) provided a clear picture of what 
American workers want on their jobs today. American workers reported that they 
want more involvement and greater say in their jobs, they would like this 
involvement to take the form of joint committees with management and would 
prefer to elect members of those committees rather than have managers select them. 
They prefer cooperative committees to potentially conflictual relationships. A 
sizable minority are in workplaces where they and their fellow workers want to be 
represented by a union. 
The Commission's recommendations only provide a starting point for responding to 
these expectations. Clearly, the first necessary steps are to deliver on the promise of 
labor law to provide workers with a real choice over whether or not to be 
represented by a union. Clarifying the law to insure that it no longer limits sensible 
and modern forms of employee participation and labor- management cooperation is 
an equally necessary starting point. But if we are to fully respond to what workers 
are saying, further experimentation with new institutional forms are needed as well. 
Workers, not labor and management representatives, appear to be calling for 
institutions that resemble representative councils similar to the European style works 
councils. 
The Commission did not recommend creation of these types of councils because of 
opposition from business representatives and lack of strong endorsement by labor. 
But clearly, there is room for experimentation that, over time, might produce an 
acceptable and effective American version of a workplace council. 
Making the Most of the Recommendations
If taken together and implemented in a coordinated fashion, the package of 
legislative, administrative, and private actions could improve the climate for 
employment relations, and produce the mutual gains expected by the workforce and 
needed by the national economy. But, if history is any guide, the process of creating 
a new labor policy will take a long time. Although there is no clear consensus over 
labor policy, some small steps have been taken to open and broaden the debate and 
to include some new voices in the process. Even assuming the appropriate 
legislation is enacted it will undoubtedly also take time for experimentation at the 
grass roots level to develop the same empirical base of experience and the political 
constituency for new forms of workplace governance. 
In summary, the New Deal labor policy framework has been opened up for debate. 
Some appropriate and necessary repairs to it were suggested that allow workers to 
exercise the rights it promises and allow employers and employees to gain 
maximum value from employee participation. Opportunities to develop new models 
of governance are provided for those willing to take advantage of them. 
Future Scenarios
While it is impossible to predict the future given the range of choices facing these 
different parties, at least three future scenarios can be envisioned, depending on 
what Congress, the Administration, and leaders of labor, business, women, and other 
civil rights groups do with the Commission's recommendations. 
Scenario 1: Continued Political Stalemate
Unfortunately, the most likely outcome of the forthcoming debates over labor policy 
is continued stalemate. The conservative dominance in Congress makes it more 
difficult for the Administration to carry forward a comprehensive modernization of 
labor policies called for by the Commission's recommendations. The labor 
movement is also wary of opening up labor law in what it views as a hostile 
Congress. Instead, debate may be sidetracked over efforts to dismantle certain 
aspects of New Deal labor policies without reconstructing them in a fashion 
appropriate to the modern workplace. 
If the stalemate over labor policy continues, we can expect continued union 
membership declines, increased polarization of labor and management at the 
national level, more resistance by union leaders and workers to innovation within 
individual enterprises, and further growth in the gap in income and working 
conditions between those with and those without individual labor market power 
derived through education. As a result, the gap between worker expectations and 
workplace reality will widen for many workers. 
The growth in employment litigation is likely to continue as these frustrations 
mount. In this environment, anti-union and anti- government sentiments will 
intensify among employers and the cycle of conflict and distrust will only escalate. 
This scenario therefore essentially puts off the task of modernizing labor policies to 
a later date, perhaps only when these pent up worker, labor, and employer tensions 
reach their boiling point. The question in my mind is not if but when this point will 
be reached. 
Scenario 2: Congressional Stalemate and Administrative
Experimentation Even if Congress remains stalemated over the basic provisions of 
labor law, the Administration could experiment with some of the ideas suggested in 
the Commission's report. For example, the NLRB can use its rule making authority 
to address some of the problems associated with joint employer and contingent work 
settings. OSHA might experiment with self-enforcement systems with a variety of 
different forms of employee participation and labor-management committee 
arrangements. Other Department of Labor offices could step up their efforts to 
encourage and defer to alternative dispute resolution processes and take a more 
outcome oriented approach to workplaces that have active self-governance systems 
in place. The EEOC could likewise step up its experimentation with ADR systems 
and high quality private dispute resolution procedures. The labor movement could 
continue to encourage expansion of labor-management partnerships in settings 
where unions now represent workers and incrementally negotiate expansions of the 
issues and the workers brought under the umbrella of these partnership 
arrangements. Employers might support continued experimentation and some 
employers might even take steps to integrate their employee participation, union-
management partnerships, and dispute resolution systems into a comprehensive 
approach to workplace governance. Some states might step forward and provide 
models for future national policies. 
This scenario would produce both some continued incremental innovation but at the 
same time result in a corresponding growth in battles between workers and 
managers in those employment settings where either management or union 
representatives remain committed to traditional views of each other and of their 
respective roles in employment relationship. Thus, there would be few macro-
economic benefits and considerable macro-economic and social risks associated 
with this approach. Whether islands of innovation could survive and expand or get 
swamped in the larger sea of conflict would remain to be seen. 
Scenario 3: A Coalition for Mutual Gains
However unlikely it now seems, it is possible to envision what could happen if a 
broad based coalition took full advantage of the starting points provided in the 
Commission's report by enacting the necessary legislative changes, taking the 
required administrative actions, and promoting continued innovation in America's 
workplaces. One major benefit would be a significant improvement in the climate 
for labor-management relations at national and workplace levels. It would open the 
door to experimentation with new approaches to participation, representation, and 
workplace governance. Whether this would be enough to reduce the gaps in 
earnings and expectations that now exist in American workplaces is still unclear. 
Whether it would usher in an era of more continuous learning and change in public 
policy also remains to be seen. But this is the best chance we have to achieve these 
results. 
While obviously I believe Scenario 3 offers the best hope for achieving results that 
are mutually beneficial to workers, employers and the American economy, at the 
moment it seems the least likely of the three scenarios. 
 FIGURE 1
                 GOALS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WORKPLACE
             Expand coverage of employee participation and
             labor-management partnerships to more workers
             and more workplaces and to a broader array of
             decisions.
             Provide workers an uncoerced opportunity to
             choose, or not choose, a bargaining
             representative and to engage in collective
             bargaining.
             Improve resolution of violations of workplace
             rights.
             Decentralize and internalize responsibility
             for workplace regulations.
             Improve workplace health and safety.
             Enhance the growth of productivity in the
             economy as a whole.
             Increase training and learning at the
             workplace and related institutions.
             Reduce inequality by raising the earnings and
             benefits of workers in the lower part of the
             wage distribution.
             Upgrade the economic positions of contingent workers
             
             Increase dialogue and learning at the national
             and local levels.
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